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Jeremy Corbyn’s continued leadership of the Labour party, both the number and enthusiasm 
of his supporters, and Labour’s better than predicted performance at the 2017 General 
Election, has been contrary to the expectations of many pundits and political scientists. This is 
not to say that political scientists should have ‘called Corbyn’ or necessarily be anything close 
to 100% accurate in predictions about future events – we shouldn’t, and arguably prediction 
is an increasingly oversold role of the discipline. All the same, this contrast between 
expectations and reality has been made especially obvious owing to the very public way in 
which many pundits and political scientists declared that Corbyn would not last too long in his 
job and, while remaining in it, would perform catastrophically badly. Since 2015, a good many 
of us have made contributions to public debates that have then taken on new life as part of an 
ongoing narrative about Corbyn and his Labour party that continually plays out in print, 
broadcast, and social media.i This raises questions about the substantive content of these 
contributions and calls for some speculation as to their source or motivation. 
 
My claim in this paper is that the manner in which Corbyn and his supporters were discussed 
by prominent political scientists and pundits was reflective of an underlying generally 
dismissive attitude towards the political dynamics that his candidacy and subsequent 
leadership represented and have set in motion. I contribute to ongoing discussion in this area 
(Dean 2016, 2017; Hayton 2018) by clarifying and discussing the form of the so-called ‘Corbyn 
problem’ present within the UK political punditry and political science community (Dean 2016). 
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Richard Hayton has observed that, ‘the widespread failure to anticipate—or perhaps more 
importantly, adequately account for—the rise of Corbyn and Labour’s unexpectedly strong 
performance in the 2017 general election reflects the fact that key tenets of British politics are 
being challenged on multiple fronts’ (2018, p.9). Although we are not, as a discipline, quite at 
‘economics in 2008’ levels of crisis (Earle et al. 2017), the current moment seems to call for 
some self-reflection. 
 
In this paper, I do three things. First, I identify a group of intensely-politically involved 
individuals who collectively hold the power to shape shared political meanings and 
understandings and locate some mainstream British political scientists within it. Second, I 
outline five points of opposition that this group had to Corbyn, demonstrating that although 
their contributions often have the appearance of objectivity, they are normative in nature and 
largely conform to a dominant ideological standpoint seemingly shared among the group. 
Taken together, I claim that these are demonstrative of a kind of epistemic snobbery towards 
a political movement that this group found suspect in both content and form. Third, I reflect 
more explicitly on the role of British political science in this context. I argue that there are 
concerns around how our inculcation into this group, which seems likely to escalate, might be 
affecting our academic endeavours as well as how we present ourselves and our work to the 
wider public. 
 
Identifying the intensely politically-involved 
When I speak of the intensely politically-involved I have in mind a group of individuals who hold 
positions of social power that allow them to shape dominant conceptions of politics and 
political activity. These people make a lot of the proverbial political weather and are continually 
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asked to comment on it in some sort of professional capacity. They include prominent 
members of the news media, notable academics or other leading political professionals, and 
former or current politicians who are especially influential or highly thought-of within the two 
previous groups. Indeed, the chances are that if you are reading this paper, you are one of 
these people or have the potential (in terms of resources, education, connections, and so on) 
to become one of them. It’s a category that is perhaps wider in scope than the oft-referred to 
‘political class’, but more limited than ‘the elite’ or ‘the establishment’ (Jones 2015; Allen 
2018).  
 
The increasing role of this group in public political discussions can be seen as part of a wider 
pattern of professional specialisation in the political sphere: whereas once politics might have 
been the domain of jobbing amateurs aided by a relatively small supporting cast of assistants, 
political institutions and politics have, over time, professionalised and specialised (Cairney 
2007; Allen and Cairney 2017). Broadly, this has led to a ‘desynchronisation of political and 
quotidian experience’ leaving many people in a situation where ‘the temptation is to leave the 
formidable task of keeping up’ with news and current events ‘to others and particularly to the 
mass media’ (Coleman 2018, p.165). As Aeron Davis notes, ‘British-based elites’ have over time 
transformed national institutions into ‘organisations for dealing with other elites rather than 
catering to publics and society’ (2018, p.23). In sum, politics has arguably become a distinct 
and specialised professional field in and of itself. 
 
One indicator of this specialisation lies in the occupational backgrounds of national-level 
legislators prior to their election. Patterns in the UK Parliament are relatively clear, with a 
growing number of MPs having professional experience in politics prior to their election – this 
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has risen from under five per cent in 1983 to over fifteen per cent in 2015 (Criddle 2015). 
Although not a total domination of political assemblies by any stretch, the rise of the 
professional politician, forged through their experience of explicitly political labour prior to 
becoming an elected representative, is notable.  Linked to legislative composition is a broader 
kind of labour specialization that has accelerated since the late 1980s when legislatures 
increased the scale of their staffing operations in order to cope with the volume and pace of 
the work they were expected to complete (Romzek and Utter 1997). Others have linked 
specialization to wider democratic decline, seeing the ‘professionalisation of parties, in terms 
of increased full-time staff...as a consequence and part of this decline: a change towards more 
professionalised organizations in which grassroots activists are replaced by full-time 
employees’ (Karlsen and Saglie 2017, p.3). The numbers of political staff employed by political 
parties, political institutions, and individual politicians has grown steadily since this time as 
have efforts to streamline their work once in post (Shogan 2006).  
 
A prominent section of the intensely-involved are political journalists, particularly political 
columnists, also known as the ‘commentariat’ or ‘punditocracy’ (Duff 2008). Opinion, rather 
than reporting, has come to claim a larger role in the British journalistic landscape in the past 
two decades (Blumler and Coleman 2010). In the British case, it is increasingly common for the 
columnists themselves to become part of the story, supplementing their published writings 
with frequent commentary on political events, but also their own lives, on Twitter. There is 
also a revolving door of sorts between explicitly political roles and more journalistic or 
commentary-focused roles. Take Nick Timothy, for example, the former Chief of Staff to Prime 
Minister Theresa May. Prior to working in Downing Street, Timothy worked within the 
Conservative Party’s Research Department, the Home Office (with May), an education charity 
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and has, following his resignation in 2017, been a columnist for the Daily Telegraph. Many 
other political commentators fit part or all of this same bill, working closely with, and constantly 
writing about, senior politicians of all parties. To put it another way, although these individuals 
may hold different positions, they exist firmly within the same world (Duff 2008; Davis 2018). 
 
Alongside this, political parties are increasingly outsourcing work on campaigns and ongoing 
political work to professional consultants of various kinds. In doing so, the focus is on the 
perceived non-partisan political expertise of such individuals, not solely the strength or content 
of their political beliefs (e.g. Issenberg 2012). Supplementing core networks of partisan political 
staffers is a cottage industry of campaign consultants, policy consultants, and media liaisons. 
Many of these, notably Theo Bertram, Jo Green, Mark Pack, and Hopi Sen have gone on to 
offer ongoing political commentary online via Twitter, their own blogs, and the media.ii Also in 
such networks, one would expect to find think-tank employees, academics in the role of ‘policy 
intellectuals’, specific taskforces or focused units within government, and charity or other 
third-sector actors (Ball and Exley 2010, p.152). 
 
A prominent and growing group of British political scientists now also exist firmly within the 
milieu of intensely-politically involved individuals described here. I admit that this group 
remains a minority of the discipline and there is a risk of exaggerating the role and importance 
of this group. I think there are, however, good reasons to take note of these activities 
nonetheless. First, the profile of British political science has almost certainly risen among other 
elements of the intensely politically-involved. Although it is hard to quantify this with any 
precision, it is increasingly common for members of the British political science community to 
write comment pieces for national newspapers, to appear on TV or radio discussing political 
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events, and to appear at Westminster-based events hosted by think-tanks or political parties.iii 
This is not to say that the activity of ‘impact’ is necessarily new (Pearce and Evans 2018), but 
the general standing and relevance of the discipline seems to have increased in these circles 
in recent years, and these activities have entered the mainstream of academic life. Second, 
this is happening owing to a growing number of incentives to participate in these activities. We 
are increasingly doing political science in public as a result of both the instrumental incentives 
offered by REF and the research councils of the UK (Flinders and John 2013), as well as a sense 
that public-facing activities are something we should be doing, normatively speaking (Flinders 
2013). So-called ‘impact activities’ have been found to be perceived by academics as related 
to various measures of career success (Chubb and Reed 2018), something that suggests this 
pattern is likely to reproduce itself to some extent. Third, those political scientists who do 
achieve a larger than average profile among the intensely politically-involved become de facto 
ambassadors for the discipline within this group and those members of the public at large who 
are paying attention. Again, although a numerically small group, therefore, they will loom large 
in public perceptions of the discipline. Consequently, the discipline as a whole should, ideally, 
care about this. For better or worse, I argue that this leaves British political science as part of 
this group, albeit still a minor player in relative terms – we are in positions of power and 
influence, helping to shape collective meanings and understandings of politics. As a discipline 
(or at least parts of a discipline), our influence has reached a point where ‘concerns have…been 
raised that British politics scholars…are, consciously or not, at risk of being co-opted into the 
‘Westminster bubble’ which…might also compromise the impartiality of the researchers 
themselves, or at least circumscribe the questions they are willing to explore’ (Hayton 2018, 
p.9). As I will discuss further later on, the way in which we use this power and influence, and 
how we present the discipline to the public, matters.  
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Taken together, we might consider the intensely politically-involved as bearing some 
characteristics of an epistemic community (Haas 1991) or thought collective (Fleck 1935), 
within which assumptions regarding what counts as a relevant domain-specific epistemic good 
are largely shared. Stephen Coleman, discussing the media specifically, writes 
 
Members of the ‘commentariat’, who earn their living by asserting the boundaries of 
descriptive and predictive political reality, can be insensitive to accounts of human 
experience that unsettle their normative assumptions…expert commentators tend to 
draw upon a narrow explanatory range which at its worst generates an impression of 
complacent knowingness (2018, p.164). 
 
Within this group, discussion is often self-referential and takes the form of discipline-specific 
or technical language that Thomas Christiano refers to as ‘esoteric’: ‘statements within the 
area of expertise whose truth value is very difficult if not impossible for someone outside the 
community of experts to ascertain’ (2012, p.37). Historically, this might not have mattered so 
much as the kind of technical and esoteric discussion undertaken by this group would have 
been more likely to place almost exclusively in academic journals or through private 
interactions but increasingly such discussions take place in public, often on social media 
platform Twitter (Hayton 2018). Historically, it is also unlikely that any evaluation or comment 
would have been instantaneous; technology, mainly via the invention of social media and a 
changing media business model, has made any contributions along such lines more rapid.  
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This comes together in a political culture that is ‘intense, insular and self-
referencing…evolv[ing] rapidly through a plethora of exchanges and communication’ (Davis 
2018, p.69). The conversations have a distinct flavour: an interest in process over substance, a 
preference for certain kinds of knowledge, primarily statistics, and a mode of engagement that 
is at pains to assert its political objectivity. As a result, individuals who are able and willing to 
participate on these terms are best placed to do so, and to be heard. These are likely to be: 
 
Network of intellectual labourers that spans the universities, political parties, political 
staffers, interest group associations, and parts of the administration. These are experts 
in economics, sociology, law, political science, and the natural sciences. They influence 
the making and evaluation of policy. But they also monitor the processes and outcomes 
of policy-making and can broadcast their opinions on these matters (Christiano 2012, 
p.35). 
 
 
There are also compositional concerns regarding this group. Given that these positions are 
socially powerful and that evidence suggests certain groups of society gain disproportionate 
access to these positions, the worry is that these individuals might not only think alike in certain 
ways, they may well be alike. Of course, these two facts are likely related. As Coleman puts it, 
‘the capacity to select, frame and prioritise events is unequally shared, with a few dominant 
voices blaring their messages with relentless intensity, while other atomised and marginalised 
voices are all but drowned out, even when they represent a widely shared perspective’ (2018, 
p.164). Jeffrey Green refers to this legacy of inequality as the ‘shadow of unfairness’, ‘the 
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plutocratic incursion of socioeconomic status into the spheres of educational and political 
opportunity’ (2016, p.5). 
 
A broad church of research has established the enormous scale of inequality in income, wealth, 
health, education, social capital, and political influence that persists around the world, 
including in Britain and other advanced democracies. These inequalities begin to influence 
individuals’ lives even prior to their birth (see Barry 2005) and then prodigiously follow them 
to the grave. Income inequality increased markedly in the UK between the late 1970s and mid-
1990s (Lindert 2000) and has remained relatively stable in the 20 or so years since. Inequality, 
specifically being at the sharp end of it, has since been linked to decreasing or low levels of 
political participation (Evans and Tilley 2017). In politics, we know that men, members of ethnic 
majorities, and the privately-educated, among others, are more likely to end up as Members 
of Parliament (MPs) than the average member of British society (Allen 2018). Considering the 
societal elite more generally, there is wide-ranging evidence that attending an elite private 
school can leave you up to ‘94 times more likely to take up an elite position than individuals 
attending other schools’ (Reeves et al. 2017, p.1160). Similar findings exist even in cases where 
social mobility is in evidence, showing that higher status (and more powerful) occupations are 
less likely to be entered by those who gain access to them as a consequence of upward mobility 
(Friedman et al. 2015). Of particular relevance to the case I am making here, evidence has 
shown that journalism and academia are both industries dominated by those from middle-
class backgrounds (Friedman et al. 2017).  
 
These compositional distortions should be borne in mind while considering what follows. 
Without suggesting a deterministic link, these data should force us to think about the existence 
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of this group in terms of power; especially the preservation of longstanding accumulations of 
power, but also the desire to be close to such power, perhaps in the hope that some of (the 
benefits of) it might fall your way. Briefly, I would raise two specific concerns. First, these data 
suggest that those who find themselves in a position where they are able to shape and enforce 
dominant conceptions of politics are likely to be beneficiaries (broadly conceived) of the 
inequalities outlined above. Consequently, the kinds of activities and behaviours valued by 
those holding this power will also be disproportionately held by others who are similarly 
already socially-powerful. Second is the possibility that the expectations shaped and 
maintained by this group, reflecting longstanding unequal relations of power within society, 
are unlikely to grant too much epistemic authority to individuals holding views that offer any 
serious challenge to the status quo. There is the potential, therefore, that those advocating 
social change are going to struggle to be taken seriously by those who hold the power to shape 
dominant meanings and conceptions of valid political opinions and activities and who could 
potentially aid the political success of their ideas. 
 
Mapping the ‘Corbyn problem’ 
Having established the existence of this group, I identify five core elements in how the 
intensely-politically involved reacted to Corbyn, arguing that, taken together, these comprise 
a relatively unified ideologically-constructed opposition to him, his supporters, and his ideas. I 
resist defining ‘Corbynism’, primarily because such an exercise would be one of intellectual 
history that I could do not do justice to here. Additionally, comparing various accounts against 
a ‘true’ or ‘authentic’ one would be somewhat missing the point, as my target is those very 
accounts, accurate or otherwise. 
 
   
 
   
 
11
Ideology 
The first feature of the intensely politically-involved’s opposition to Corbyn (and his 
supporters) is explicitly ideological in nature, whereby commentators railed against the hard-
left and focused on the supposedly likely consequences of Corbyn taking power. These bear 
the obvious hallmarks of ‘normal’ political debate in the form of traditional ideological debate, 
whereby the standard in question is some kind of ideological congruence or acceptability, in 
broader terms. In some sense, therefore, this kind of ideological opposition from this group 
who favour centrist-style politics is perhaps to be expected in all cases involving reporting on, 
and discussion of, politicians who fall outside of a broadly-defined mainstream. However, 
studies have noted that ‘Jeremy Corbyn was represented unfairly by the British press through 
a process of vilification that went well beyond the normal limits of fair debate and 
disagreement in a democracy’ (Cammaerts et al. 2016, p.1). This ideological hostility in many 
ways underpins the other elements of the narrative surrounding Corbyn and his supporters, 
whereby this group are seen to lack the credentials necessary for the kinds of political 
involvement they undertake. I identify four further parts to this, focusing on intelligence, time, 
forms of political involvement, and credibility.  
 
Intelligence 
A common theme of the commentary on Corbyn is that he and his supporters are stupid. Toby 
Young leads this particular pack, writing ‘Whether you measure a party’s intelligence by the IQ 
of its leaders or its voters, Labour is now the least intelligent party’.iv Martin Amis, the novelist, 
describes Corbyn as ‘undereducated’,v while Angela Epstein writes that he is ‘too thick to be 
Prime Minister’ and lacks ‘clear natural talent’.vi Alex Massie, in a similar vein, writes: 
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The thing about Jeremy Corbyn’s supporters is they’d be funny if they weren’t so 
pathetic. Or is it the other way round? I can never remember…It is not so much that 
Corbyn and his supporters are wrong about (almost) everything (though they are) but 
that they are so thoroughly, irredeemably, head-in-hands, stupid about (almost) 
everything. They are even wrong for the wrong reasons.vii 
 
This quote combines some straightforward ad hominen attacks with a more telling critique. 
What is especially interesting here is that Massie takes aim at the epistemic grounding of 
Corbyn supporters’ views (‘wrong for the wrong reasons’), not just their content. There is also 
a suggestion that those who have decided that they like Corbyn and his politics could not have 
reached this position soundly or without underhand persuasion. Bagehot, writing in The 
Economist, talks of how Corbyn ‘continues to mesmerise his young supporters’, the implication 
of youthful transfixion ringing clear.viii Perhaps the most notable example of this line of 
opposition was Janan Ganesh’s promptly-deleted Twitter assertion that Corbyn supporters 
were ‘thick as pigshit’.ix This sense that Corbyn’s supporters lacked the kind of epistemic 
grounding for their political views that is traditionally seen as worthy of further examination 
also pervaded academic discussion of his popularity. Or, rather, the lack of discussion: as 
Jonathan Dean notes, ‘Corbynism was, for many [academics], so self-evidently misguided that 
it barely merited any scholarly attention or analysis’ (2016).  
 
Time 
A further element relates to time, specifically the valorising of time spent involved in politics. 
For example, the Guardian columnist Marina Hyde posted the following on Twitter: ‘People 
Who Discovered Politics In 2015 are the new People Who Discovered Football In 1990’.x Not 
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especially subtly, the aim here seems to be to demarcate ‘true supporters’ or enthusiasts from 
Johnny-come-lately types who should be downgraded or disparaged in some sense.xi This 
seems to me to be an especially pernicious line to take. One cannot create time that has not 
existed, nor can one turn back time. Perversely, this credential is often invoked by those who 
are wont to bemoan the lack of political interest of millennials or the young or similar, but in 
doing this show themselves not to care about participation in politics as such, but rather about 
participation in their politics (or at least politics that they deem suitable).xii Janet Daley, writing 
in The Telegraph, offers an adjunct attack, arguing that Corbyn’s supporters are ‘fools’ engaged 
in ‘adolescent rebellion’ and compares them to a different group, spoken of with approval, 
who, ‘whatever their dissatisfactions with the present political arrangements…do not see the 
solution as being student union socialism’.xiii Similarly, Corbyn’s supporters were regularly 
derided by established political figures as being a ‘fan club’ or ‘socialism fans’ rather than 
serious members of the Labour Party or Labour voters.xiv 
 
Political activities 
This brings us to a related preoccupation with the validity of certain modes of political action. 
Sky News, for example, refer to Corbyn as a ‘professional protestor turned leader’, contrasting 
the former and the latter.xv Similarly, the American political advisor Arnie Graf describes 
Corbynite politics in the following way: 
 
It feels more like a, well I’m free to speak now, I don’t work for the party. In the 1960s, 
at our universities, in the anti-Vietnam war movement, this surge feels like that to me. 
It feels, I don’t want to be overly harsh, but part of it feels like student politics to me. It 
doesn’t feel like people who are trying to become the government…There’s 
   
 
   
 
14
excitement, I can appreciate that, but I don’t see, it’s not the kind of politics that I would 
be interested in.xvi 
 
What (just about) remains unspoken here is Graf’s view that legitimate political action looks 
and feels a certain way, and whatever activity is going on in Corbyn’s case is definitely not it. 
The disparaging reference to ‘student politics’ is presumably a suggestion of an immaturity or 
underdevelopment of their political ideas, something that links back to the previous issue of 
time. 
 
One hallmark of Corbyn’s campaign preceding the 2017 general election was the holding of 
relatively large rallies in various parts of the country. Often, these would attract significant 
numbers of attendees, generally a mix of Labour Party members, activists, and other members 
of the public. Such rallies, although planned, seemed to have an element of spontaneity and 
unpredictability to them. This was in sharp contrast to the well-oiled and closely-managed 
events engineered by other political leaders over the previous 20 years or so (Pettitt 2006). 
Indeed, the entire ethos of Corbyn’s rallies seemed to be aimed at being less like these stage-
managed events and more like a slightly chaotic trade union event or even, perhaps, a music 
festival.xvii It is fair to say that these rallies were unpopular with many, the charge against them 
being that the number of attendees was still minute in comparison to the scale of the 
electorate at large (even in a given constituency) and that people who attended were 
unrepresentative of this absent group. The Economist wrote that ‘Furthermore, most Corbyn 
rallies take place in solid Labour seats, where the leader preaches to the converted. There is 
little evidence of the campaign attempting to persuade Conservative voters to change sides’.xviii 
On this reading, the rallies don’t serve any obvious electoral purpose. At worst, they are a kind 
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of comfort blanket, insulating Corbyn from the harsh reality that opinion polling presented him 
with. Corbyn clearly picked up on this narrative himself, giving an account of it at one such 
rally: 
 
There are cynics who calculate these things in politics who say “well, Labour said this, 
Tories said that…Now, what did all that mean? Well, it means this: you have to 
understand that we down here really fully understand this whole system and all those 
people out there, turning up at Labour rallies, they don’t really understand it”. Well, I 
tell you this, we absolutely do understand it!xix 
 
Credibility 
A final, but perhaps unifying, feature of much of the narrative surrounding Corbyn and his 
supporters is the notion of credibility seen (by those invoking it) as something existing beyond 
ideology and fixed, beyond the reach agency in the form of political change. Although widely 
invoked in journalistic discussion, credibility is notable for being a concept also used by political 
scientists when discussing Corbyn in public. For example, one British political scientist wrote in 
May 2017: 
 
Jeremy Corbyn has to go. He is demonstrably unfit to be leader of the Opposition or to 
be Prime Minister. He lacks the personal skills needed, the temperament, or the ability 
to balance an argument between competing perspectives. He is also holding Labour 
back from being a credible party of government. Indeed, it is unclear if Labour is even 
a credible party of opposition.xx 
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Similarly, another wrote in September 2015: 
 
Like the Tories during their wilderness years, Labour looks as if it’s about to strand itself 
outside the so-called “zone of acceptability”—a policy range stretching from centre-
right to centre-left, not too conservative but not too liberal. Without being located 
there or thereabouts a party is unlikely to be given the benefit of the doubt by sufficient 
voters to win a majority.xxi 
 
Narratives of this kind are rooted in a view of politics as triangulation, growing out of theories 
initially proposed by Anthony Downs (1957) and then Anthony Giddens (2011), and enacted 
by both Tony Blair and, to a lesser extent, David Cameron.xxii The Downsian flavour gives 
pronouncements of this kind the air of a scientific absolute and are, therefore, useful fodder 
for media coverage. However, it is also clear that such a move has the effect of side-lining 
anything that isn’t deemed credible right now, something that is true of political ideas and 
policies that have, in time, gone on to become part of the furniture. Using credibility as a 
touchstone, especially in a way that considers it to be fixed, non-ideological, and context-
resistant, is not only setting commentators up for a fall but is itself a normative move. 
Credibility is also used in reference to spending plans, with Labour accused of ‘being unable to 
present credible costs’ for its policy proposals if elected.xxiii Again, however, such a notion can 
only operate within a wider but distinct set of ideological markers that remain hidden in plain 
sight. 
 
The point here is not to say that normative statements should be off-limits for political 
scientists. On the contrary, the point should rather be to acknowledge that politics goes all the 
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way down in these cases - indeed, the decision to comment at all is itself a normative decision, 
as is whether to comment via one medium or news source over another. More specifically, it 
is notable in this debate that those political scientists who have expressed a more sympathetic 
view of Corbyn, such as Jonathan Dean (2016), have acknowledged that they are not offering 
a ‘view from nowhere’ (Nagel 1986), Dean writing ‘I am, however, rather more pro-Corbyn 
than most of my political science colleagues’. Although I admit it might be tedious to have to 
lay out our normative cards and commitments each time we speak in public - and I’m not sure 
that expecting people to do this is a useful or feasible response – we at least need to practically 
acknowledge the reality that normativity will be distributed more or less evenly across all parts 
of the debate even if the normativity inherent in the dominant stance goes unnoticed 
compared to alternative stances.  
 
There are two main reasons to be suspicious of the sheen of objectivity in political matters. 
First, the specific case. This is relatively simple: the criteria discussed above are clearly rooted 
in a form of politics, both in terms of content and presentation, broadly synonymous with that 
seen in both New Labour in the 1990s and 2000s and in David Cameron’s Conservative party 
that followed (Lees-Marshment 2001; Davis and Seymour 2010). The likelihood that these 
quite specific criteria align with some objective ones existing in a broader sense seems low. 
Second, and in a more general sense, one can make the case that it isn’t clear which kinds of 
epistemic goods will be relevant to politics. To establish agreement on such credentials, we 
would require a procedure-independent standard against which political acumen could be 
gauged – that is, an agreed-upon way of assessing political outcomes that didn’t make 
reference to the process by which the decision that led to them was made. It is uncertain that 
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this is a plausible assumption to make. In terms of political theory, what have been termed as 
‘realist’ thinkers see disagreement as ‘permanent and ineradicable’ (Sleat 2016, p.31; Stears 
2007). On this view, the fact that such ineradicable conflict exists is the reason that politics 
exists. Without conflict, there would be no need for politics. As Matt Sleat writes, ‘politics takes 
place in conditions of ineradicable conflict and is hence a site of perpetual struggle for power 
and dominance’ (2016, p.31). On this view, one will never be able to place oneself outside of 
politics, or claim that political goals are, for the most part or in certain policy domains, settled. 
However, I don’t think one even need necessarily accept the idea that disagreement is 
permanently ineradicable to acknowledge that conflict is the driving force of politics right now 
and for the foreseeable future in advanced democracies (Finlayson 2015). 
 
Combined, I think that what we see here is a kind of epistemic snobbery ‘whereby people who 
do not meet the above criteria of political inclusion are not seen as worthy participants or 
contributors in political discussions, or whereby their political opinions are devalued in some 
way’ (Allen 2018, p.11). This relies on the ideological construction of an ideal type of political 
participation undertaken by an ideal political participant, divergence from which is considered 
suspicious in some sense. This person has extensive experience in formal electoral politics, 
focuses attention almost exclusively on electoral politics and associated political institutions, 
and espouses views that can be considered ‘credible’, this seen as a non-ideological category 
derived in part from a calculation of the location of the median voter.  
 
Alongside this, there is an additional element here that is worth reflecting on. On the one hand, 
individuals who do seek to engage in politics but do so not in this ideal type way (i.e. many 
Corbyn supporters) are considered with the suspicion and derision shown above. Conversely, 
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individuals who don’t appear to display much interest at all but do engage in formal politics on 
rare occasions in the form of voting at elections are more readily accepted. Such a view is 
embodied in the kind of truism that ‘most people don’t think about politics for more than a 
few minutes a week’, or similar, that one often hears in political discussions among the 
intensely-politically involved.xxiv I suspect that the willing acceptance of this idea, and 
resistance to the possibility that one could be engaged in politics in a different form, stems 
from the fact that this disinterested model of engagement essentially validates the existence 
of a smaller group of intensely-involved individuals who then take on a kind of caretaker or 
gatekeeper role, looking after politics while everyone else is busy with their lives. With a hint 
of the (willing) martyr, they watch over democracy while others go about their business. I here 
echo the thoughts of Peter Mair (2009, p.29), who suspected that much discussion of 
democratic reform might actually be 'not intended to open up or reinvigorate the practice as 
such, but rather to redefine democracy in such a way that does not require any substantial 
emphasis on popular sovereignty, so that it can cope more easily with the decline of popular 
involvement'.  To put it another way, the current situation suits this group; if things were 
different, or if the possibility of something different becoming the norm were to be 
acknowledged, their status within it might come under threat. 
 
The Corbyn problem and British political science 
The patterns described above have implications not only for the relatively small group of 
political scientists who played some part in them, but for all of us who study British politics. 
Many of these apply to the entirety of the intensely politically-involved group identified above 
but the various incentives and pressures that affect the behaviour of professional journalists, 
for example, differ massively from those affecting academics. Additionally, and unlike among 
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journalists, the question of what the public role of British political scientists should be still feels 
like something that is up for grabs. The rules of engagement are fuzzy to non-existent, a 
consequence of this being that there remains a chance for the discipline to engage in a debate 
about the norms that we want to govern behaviour in this realm.  
 
As discussed earlier, there is a general contention to be made that the predominant way in 
which British political science has come to exist in public is rooted firmly in a traditional 
Westminster Model focus on national-level electoral politics and that, ‘within the field of 
British politics, the main figures to achieve media prominence have been a relatively small band 
of political scientists primarily concerned with the study of parties, elections and voting’ 
(Hayton 2018, p.10).xxv As Richard Hayton notes, 
 
Faced with demands for instant reactions to, and explanations for, unexpected political 
twists and turns, it is perhaps unsurprising that scholars have reached for what might 
be seen as conventional norms (or ‘rules’) of British politics – the Westminster view 
(2018, p.9). 
 
Indeed, many of the most prominent political scientists on Twitter regularly share opinion polls 
and other data on public opinion from a range of sources on an almost daily basis. During the 
2017 election campaign proper, this regularity appeared to increase even further. Studies have 
shown that British election media coverage has come to be dominated by the so-called 
‘horserace’ of who is likely to win and vice versa (Blumler and Coleman 2010), raising the 
question of what the role of British politics academics is in this process. As Hayton writes, ‘while 
academics can do little to affect media coverage, as scholars of British politics we do have a 
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responsibility to avoid being corralled into media-driven narratives’ (2018, p.10). I am perhaps 
less sanguine on this point and would argue that we probably have more ability to affect 
narratives than we think, certainly in the longer run; given increasing pressures on media 
outlets to generate content at relatively low cost, academics are likely to look like a budget-
friendly option whenever a talking head is required in the newsroom. 
 
The proliferation of opinion polls, and the willingness of political scientists to provide the media 
with expert validation and discussion of them, has led to something of a clash of epistemic 
perspectives, specifically regarding the role of individual experience in assessing the course of 
an election campaign. In particular, we have witnessed the opposition of two perspectives: 
that of what the polls seem to be telling us versus what individuals are seeing ‘on the doorstep’ 
or in their day-to-day lives. Polling clearly has its merits, offering far greater scientific purchase 
over the question of large-scale shifts in public opinion, and it performs consistently over time 
according to the best current evidence (Jennings and Wlezien 2018). Despite this, it isn’t clear 
that this should obviate other kinds of political discussion from media coverage. As Coleman, 
quoting Porter (1996, p.viii), notes “quantification ‘remakes the world’ through ‘strategies of 
communication’ that can never provide a ‘complete and accurate description of the external 
world’ but serve nonetheless to close down counter-interpretations by denying critics an 
authorised language of interrogation or explanation’ (2018, p.160). I think this applies to 
polling. As any social scientist trained in survey research knows, polling is in no way completely 
authoritative – indeed, high profile British academics have achieved significant impact by 
making this point (Sturgis et al. 2016) – and yet opinion polls have come to dominate election 
coverage nonetheless, bolstered by the apparent support for, and interest in, them by political 
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scientists. There are different ways of learning and knowing things about the world. Right now, 
the public face of the discipline does not reflect this. 
 
Part of this focus on the numbers, so to speak, is somewhat inevitable given the posture with 
which political science has been inserted into popular discussion of politics. For example, the 
then Vice-Chair of the Political Studies Association (PSA) referred in 2017 to PSA members as 
‘experts’ who ‘can and should be put centre-stage’ so as to provide ‘reliable evidence for 
politicians and voters’.xxvi As shown here, when invoked or introduced to public debate, 
political scientists and political science research tends to be framed as ideologically-neutral 
expertise, speaking from somewhere above and outside of the political fray. In other words, 
political scientists appear to be placed into these debates as obelisks of objectivity and, to a 
great extent, certainty. On this billing, the political scientist as public expert needs to present 
a concrete and coherent account to the audience in order to live up to expectations. Given 
this, is it any wonder that there is a temptation to reach for a pre-existing tried and tested 
explanation that is waiting to be plucked off the shelf? The entire model of doing political 
science in public that we have established around British politics seems to encourage us to 
return to the same ways of thinking that we always have and, almost systematically, precludes 
the more difficult activity of thinking in the kinds of fresh and unexpected ways that recent 
political events would seem to require of us. In the words of the PSA Vice-Chair, it becomes 
about providing 'evidence' to support or refute some existing assertion instead of offering 
deeper, more considered, reflections on core issues. Effectively, it becomes about giving an 
answer, not interrogating or reframing the question.  
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On this point, there is a broader question here about what we are doing: if we as academics 
should even be indulging in a mode of public political discussion that encourages fast-paced 
judgements and that simply uses us as commentators on fleeting events or controversies. 
Should we rather not instead aim to engage in a critical way – thinking slowly, reflectively, more 
academically? As Hayton observes (2018, pp.9-10): 
 
Through the medium of Twitter in particular, some scholars are now involved in a 
degree of public dialogue and ongoing commentary on the state of British politics that 
is unprecedented, and which is perhaps at odds with the more reflective nature of 
academic inquiry as it was more traditionally understood. There is a balance to be 
struck between the more measured approach that distinguishes academic 
commentary from journalism, and a nimbler scholarship that is better placed to 
contribute to a public educative mission that goes beyond the precincts of our 
campuses and is in tune with twenty-first century society. 
 
I agree with him on this general point, although I would also go further – it is not just the form 
of the public scholarship we undertake that matters, but also the kinds of things we talk about. 
Nick Clarke and his colleagues distinguish between the political weather and political climate, 
the former being short-term events and fluctuations in comparison to the latter, which focuses 
on longer-term trends and change (2018, p.xiii). As a discipline, perhaps we would be better 
served by caring less about the weather and more about the climate, not in the hope of 
improving the accuracy of our predictions, but rather to permit us to offer greater clarity and 
precision when we attempt to diagnose our current political ills. 
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Conclusion 
The schadenfreude that comes with watching the previously confident meekly eating their 
words aside, there are serious lessons to learn from this. For the intensely-politically involved, 
the fact that it was felt Corbyn couldn’t be understood using the usual tools appeared to 
ultimately be elided into an assumption that therefore he shouldn’t be. However, for all the 
hand-wringing in the immediate aftermath of events like Trump, Brexit, and the 2017 general 
election, has much of their approach actually changed? 
 
Far from challenging the status quo, the apparent failings of those who thrive within it seems 
to have instead strengthened their existing hand. The rise of Corbyn and related events like 
Brexit saw many commentators bemoaning that they no longer knew anything or couldn’t 
explain anything.xxvii However, this inability has not only done nothing to affect their privileged 
status within the structures of power that shape collective meaning around British politics, it 
has become a component part of it. In fact, many began to incorporate lengthy justifications 
or mea culpas into their ongoing commentary, gaining credit from other commentators for 
their commitment to approach their work in a different way from now on.xxviii Uncertainty 
about their previous approach lasted only a matter of hours as new paths forward were 
planned. As Philip Cowley put it just one day after the 2017 General Election, ‘Given how few 
people saw this coming, it’s amazing how certain some of them are about what it all means’.xxix 
 
This matters because it seems likely that there will be another Corbyn in the not too distant 
future; not Corbyn himself, of course, but another unexpected figure or movement, perhaps 
on the left, maybe on the right. Wherever, whoever, or whatever this might be, it is crucial that 
intensely-politically involved, especially political scientists, avoid merely becoming what Robert 
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Goodin has referred to as ‘handmaidens to power’ (2009, p.5). This is echoed by Hayton who 
aptly notes, ‘As students of political power, we cannot afford to lose sight of its exercise over 
our own behaviour’ (2018, p.11). Crucially, in all of these cases, we need to consider who 
benefits from us lending not only our attention but whatever legitimacy we have to dispense 
to their political activity. In short, when deciding how to conduct our academic duties, we need 
to be aware not only of the power of those who we choose to study, but also the power we 
ourselves hold in the form of our societal status and voice. In an academic age filled with the 
pressures of various assessment frameworks and other structural constraints, this is not easy. 
Sometimes, it will be professionally opportune for us to make bold predictions, befriend the 
powerful, or make curtailed but controversial statements in lieu of longer considered ones. I 
understand this, and appreciate that this is not just a simple question of individual agency but 
instead a complicated one of networked structures of power and incentives. Taking intellectual 
risks means embracing uncertainty; the model of engagement we are currently encouraged to 
participate in systematically constrains our ability (and willingness) to do this. All the same, 
though, we need to think about the long-term health and fruitfulness of the study of British 
politics. Right now, I fear we are putting that health at risk through circumspection when 
considering what that subject matter might consist of (Dean 2017), something that limits the 
potential power and utility of our explanations of political events. There is no easy fix available 
to us, and I certainly do not feel able to offer up a silver bullet here. The elusiveness of a 
response should not, however, stop us thinking more carefully about the question. 
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